When Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers shook hands in Beijing on April 6 2023, boosters predicted a commercial windfall that would redraw Gulf economics. Two years later, customs and shipping tallies show real—yet thinner‑than‑hyped—growth.
Bilateral Merchandise Trade
2022 (pre‑rapprochement): ≈ US $75 million—mostly Iranian perishables routed via Dubai.
2023: US $690 million after Riyadh quietly green‑lit 600 Saudi import licences for Iranian foodstuffs, construction stone and bitumen.
2024: US $1.14 billion, buoyed by petrochemical intermediates and Saudi export of HVAC gear to Tehran’s housing boom.
Q1 2025 (preliminary): US $350 million, tracking toward ≈ US $1.4 billion for the full year—an 18‑fold jump over 2022, yet only 0.4 % of either country’s global trade.
Shipping and Logistics
Direct Jeddah–Bandar Abbas container services, launched by Saudi‑flagged Bahri Lines in mid‑2024, now run twice weekly at 65 % capacity. Overland trucking via Kuwait remains negligible, stifled by unresolved insurance and sanctions‑linked banking risks.
Energy & Investment
Oil: Despite chatter, no crude swaps have materialised; both states compete, not cooperate, in Asian markets.
Gas: Aramco engineers visited Iran’s South Pars in December 2024, but U.S. sanctions deterred joint‑venture talk.
FDI: Riyadh’s Public Investment Fund discreetly explored a minority stake in Tehran’s planned Shahriar solar park; negotiations stalled after January 2025 when Iran insisted on payment in euros rather than yuan.
Tourism & People‑to‑People
Pilgrimage traffic recovered fastest: 850,000 Iranian pilgrims attended Hajj 2024 versus 375,000 in 2019. Saudi visa e‑portals now list Iran among priority markets for the 96‑hour stopover scheme, hinting at budding aviation ties—yet Saudia still lacks an Iran route.
Obstacles
‑ Banking channels: Only four midsize Saudi banks process Iran trade, using euro‑clearing via Luxembourg.
‑ Sanctions uncertainty: March 2025 U.S. secondary‑sanction threat on Iran’s metals dampened Saudi aluminum‑smelter exports.
‑ Security trust‑gap: January drone strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq revived hard‑liner pushback in both Majlis and Shura Council.
Bottom line: Detente has undeniably lifted bilateral commerce from statistical insignificance, but transformative Gulf‑wide integration awaits sanctions relief, stable payment rails and credible security guarantees—ingredients still missing at the two‑year mark.
Comments
Post a Comment
Comment